Recent Texas appellate decisions reflect an increased scrutiny of large awards for noneconomic damages. Together, Gregory v. Chohan, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Brown, and Jones v. Hatch reflect an emerging trend: noneconomic damages must be grounded in the evidentiary record and guided by awards in similar cases.
In Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2023), the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this matter for a new trial after a jury awarded $15 million in noneconomic damages in a wrongful death action. The Court rejected the view that a verdict must “shock the conscience” to justify remittitur or a new trial. Instead, it held that noneconomic damages must reflect a rational, evidence‑based effort to fairly compensate for the injury suffered, rather than a punitive assessment untethered from the record.
This case arose from a multi‑vehicle collision that claimed four lives after a jackknifed tractor‑trailer blocked an icy, unlit stretch of highway. A jury awarded one decedent’s family $16.8 million, including $15 million in noneconomic damages. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the award for noneconomic damages under the now-outdated “shocks the conscience” standard, which asks whether the size of the verdict is so extreme as to reflect passion, prejudice, or moral outrage.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected that approach, emphasizing that noneconomic damages are compensatory, not punitive, and that appellate review requires more than an abstract inquiry into whether a verdict appears excessive. The Court held that Texas law requires some evidence or argument from counsel explaining why a dollar amount represents fair and reasonable compensation for a nonpecuniary injury. As the Court cautioned, jurors “cannot simply pick a number and put it in the blank.”
Applying this framework to the verdict before it, the Court identified a critical gap in the record. Although the family presented extensive testimony describing the depth and duration of their grief, neither the evidence nor counsel’s argument explained why $15 million was a reasonable valuation of the mental anguish resulting from their loss. Instead, counsel relied on what the Court characterized as improper “anchoring,” invoking the cost of fighter jets and high‑priced artwork to frame the value of a human life. The Court concluded that these comparisons encouraged punishment rather than compensation and bore no rational connection to the family’s injuries.
Application in Subsequent Appellate Decisions
After Gregory, intermediate appellate courts began applying this recalibrated approach. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals took up this issue in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Brown, 729 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet.), a case involving mental anguish damages arising from a refinery explosion.
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed that juries retain discretion to award noneconomic damages but emphasized that such discretion must be exercised through a rational, evidence‑based process and assessed against awards in factually similar cases. The Court concluded that the amounts awarded for future mental anguish lacked any discernible rationale. The jury was provided no temporal framework, analytical method, or explanation for its figures, and the awards bore no coherent relationship to the severity or expected duration of the plaintiffs’ future suffering.
The refinery explosion at issue did not cause any deaths or catastrophic injuries. Compared to verdicts in workplace‑trauma cases not involving death, amputations, severe burns, or traumatic brain injuries, the noneconomic damages awarded fell well outside the ordinary range. The absence of support in the record and in comparable cases led the Court to hold that the awards were excessive.
In Jones v. Hatch, No. 04‑24‑00553‑CV, 2026 WL 926760 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 1, 2026, no pet. h.), the San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the same comparative analysis in a wrongful death action arising from a motor‑vehicle accident. In that case, the Court upheld liability, findings of intoxication and gross negligence, and the award of exemplary damages. It nevertheless concluded that the jury’s awards for parental mental anguish, loss of companionship, and the decedent’s pain and suffering were excessive when compared to the evidence and similar cases.
The Court explained that even profound grief does not support eight‑figure awards absent evidence of lasting disruption or prolonged suffering. The record showed that the parents returned to work, and that the decedent’s conscious pain lasted less than an hour. Rather than ordering a new trial immediately, the Court recommended a remittitur that substantially reduced the noneconomic damages.
Takeaways
These three decisions convey a consistent message: noneconomic damages must be grounded in the evidentiary record and limited by comparison to verdicts in factually similar cases. Evaluating a verdict for post‑trial or appellate purposes therefore requires examining whether the award bears a rational connection to both the evidence and the injury sustained. Verdicts that materially exceed amounts upheld in comparable cases are increasingly vulnerable to remittitur or remand.
